The Formulae of the Moral Law and Predispositions to Morality

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Passages cited:

1. Hume: Morality consists in the relation of actions to the rule of right... they are denominated good or ill, according as they agree or disagree with it. What then is this rule of right? … How is it determined? By reason, you say, which examines the moral relations of actions. So that moral relations are determined by the comparison of actions to a rule. And that rule is determined by considering the moral relations of objects. Is this not fine reasoning? (1751/1983, 85).
2. When I think of a **categorical** imperative, I know at once what it contains. For since the imperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity of the maxim to conform with this law, whereas the law contains no condition to which it was limited, nothing is left but the universality of a law as such, with which the maxim is ought to conform, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative actually represents as necessary.

There is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative, and it is this: **act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law** (4: 421).

1. Every other rational being represents its existence in this way, as a consequence of just the same rational ground that also holds for me. (4.429).
2. So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. (4.429)
3. the idea of the **will of every rational being as a universally legislating will**. (4.431)
4. is the supreme limiting condition of the freedom of actions of every human being (4.430)
5. Now I assert: that we must necessarily *lend* to every rational being that has a will also the idea of freedom, under which alone it acts. For in such a being we conceive a reason that is practical, i.e., has causality with regard to its objects. *Now one cannot possibly think of a reason that would self-consciously receive guidance from any other quarter with regard to its judgments, since the subject would not then attribute the determination of judgment to his reason, but to an impulse*. (4:448, my emphasis).
6. Now through no outer experience, but *solely through self-consciousness*, can I have the least representation of a thinking being. Hence objects of that sort are nothing more than the transfer of this consciousness of mine to other things, which thereby alone are represented as thinking beings. (A346/B404-405, my italics)
7. [I]t is the **moral law** of which we become conscious directly (as soon as we frame maxims of the will for ourselves) which **first**offers itself to us, and which inasmuch as reason displays it as a determining ground not to be outweighed by any sensible conditions and indeed entirely independently of them—leads straight to the idea of freedom. (5:29-30)
8. [A]sk [a man] whether, if his prince demanded, on the threat of the … penalty of death [by immediate hanging], that he give false testimony against an honest man … He will perhaps not venture to assure us whether or not he would overcome … [his] love [of life], but he must concede without hesitation that doing so would be possible for him. He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he is conscious that he ought to do it, and he cognizes freedom within himself ... (5:30)
9. From [the fact] that a being has reason it does not at all follow … that this reason contains the faculty to determine the power of choice unconditionally through the mere representation of the qualifications of its maxim for universal legislation. The most rational being … might apply the most rational reflection to these objects (incentives) … without thereby even suspecting the possibility of such a thing as the absolutely imperative moral law … Were this law not given to us from within, no amount of subtle reasoning … would produce it or win our power of choice over to it. Yet this law is the only law that makes us conscious … (of our freedom) (6:26n).
10. Respect is … something merely subjective, a feeling of a special kind, not a judgment about an object that it would be a duty to bring about or promote. For such a duty, regarded as a duty, could be represented to us only through the **respect** we have for it. A duty to have respect would thus amount to being put under obligations to duties. –Accordingly, it is not correct to say that a man has a **duty of self-esteem**; it must rather be said that the law within him unavoidably forces from him **respect** for his own being … It cannot be said that a man *has* a duty of respect toward himself, for he must have respect for the law within himself in order even to think of any duty whatsoever. (6.399)
11. The *Critique* admits absolutely no … innate **representations** *…* [O]ur cognitive faculty [does not get the representations of space and time] from objects … rather it brings them about **a priori**, out of itself. *There must indeed be a ground for it in the subject, however, which makes it possible that these representations can arise in this and no other manner … and this ground at least is* ***innate***. … (8.221-223, my italics)
12. is to be understood as the **maxim** of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person, and so as respect in the practical sense. (6.449).

The Argument for FUL:   
The concept of a 'categorical imperative' contains besides the imperative the necessity that the maxim conform to the imperative.

1. The concept of a 'categorical imperative' contains besides the imperative the necessity that the maxim conform to the imperative.
2. It is part of the concept of a 'categorical imperative' that imperative contains no restriction.
3. Therefore, there is nothing the maxim must conform to except the universality of law itself.
4. Therefore, …