

There Is No Self-Consciousness Without Inner Sense in Kant

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In my talk, I will argue that Kantian transcendental apperception and Kantian inner sense are only weakly, and not strongly independent from one another. They are two irreducible human faculties that provide two irreducible kinds of content. But they cannot operate independently from one another. In particular, there are no cases of actual self-consciousness, even not those of an awareness of our spontaneous thinking activity, that are only based on the first faculty and do not involve inner sense.

My argument will be based in the following three premises, which I will defend on textual and philosophical grounds:

- (P1) When Kant speaks about self-consciousness, he always means the awareness that we have of our mental activities or states as our own.
- (P2) For Kant, any awareness of our mental activities or states as our own implies an awareness of our own existence.
- (P3) For Kant, any awareness of the existence of something implies intuition, which in the case of the awareness of our own existence must include intuition through inner sense.

I will then offer a model of Kantian inner sense that makes the claim that even the awareness of our own spontaneous thinking involves inner sense less outrageous than it might sound.